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Abstract
The determination of  the scope of  the fiduciary duty of  loyalty, when created by contract, is not a unitary
process. It is raised following a multi-factorial enquiry, which considers the nature of  the engagement, in a
first stage. Here, no single factor is conclusive. It is then, in a separate, second stage, reduced by qualifying
contractual terms, which are applied almost strictly logically. This second stage uses the contractual doctrines
of  interpretation and implication. However, since it is a form of  the fiduciary doctrine of  authorisation,
those contractual doctrines are modified according to fiduciary principles. We argue this follows from the
underlying nature of  the fiduciary obligation as a way of  resolving its internal tensions. While this division
has not yet been fully recognised in the cases, the courts have been inching towards it. However, not fully
recognising this inevitable division and eliding the two stages has led to defective reasoning and outcomes.
Keywords: fiduciary duties; equity; contractarianism; construction; implication;
authorisation.
In this article, we seek to identify the processes in which the equitable duty of  loyalty, or,equivalently, the fiduciary duty, responds to any contractual terms that form part of  the
engagement between the parties. It might be thought that the duty of  loyalty is created in a
single-stage process. One starts with a blank slate, and then positively implies the duty of
loyalty if  the nature of  the engagement – defined by the terms of  the contract – demands
it. In this, one moves in a single step from having nothing to something.
This account is too simplistic. However, it is clear from the leading cases that the
scope of  the duty of  loyalty does depend on the terms of  the engagement.1 By scope, we
mean to which interests it does or does not apply and any particular acts, within those
interests, to which it does or does not apply. There must, therefore, be some role for the
contract. We propose that the true framework is that there are two distinct stages in which
the contract terms influence the duty of  loyalty in very different ways.
First, the duty of  loyalty is raised if  the parties are in one of  the recognised fiduciary
relationships or because of  the existence of  factors – determined from the terms of  the contract
– that demand single-minded loyalty. Here, no one factor is conclusive, making this stage
relatively uncertain. This is the wholly positive process, moving from nothing to something.
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1     Eg Kelly v Cooper [1993] AC 205 (PC) 213–4; Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd (No 1) [1995] 2 AC 145 (HL) 206.
Conversely, the second stage is a wholly negative process, where the terms of  the
contract, both express and implied, only reduce the scope of  the duty of  loyalty. The second
stage is a form of  fiduciary authorisation (meaning where the principal consents to what
would otherwise be a breach of  fiduciary duty), differing from the conventional process of
subsequent or mid-term authorisation mainly in that its terms are defined before the
engagement has commenced and not after. Here, the contractual terms, express and
implied, are applied almost strictly logically, making it much more certain, although they are
still subject to overriding fiduciary principles.
We argue this follows from the purpose of  the duty of  loyalty. It is said that the duty of
loyalty exists to protect the principal and deter the fiduciary from acts of  disloyalty by taking
away the advantage or profit.2 However, there is a competing imperative. The principal is
entitled, when fully informed of  the consequences of  doing so, to relax that rule and
authorise what would otherwise be a breach. It has been observed that it may very much be
in his or her commercial advantage to do so.3 The tension between these aims is best
resolved through such a two-stage process.
The courts have not explicitly recognised this. Indeed, authorisation has not been
subject to much critical analysis in judgments or commentary.4 Nonetheless, they have been
inching towards this position as they seek, case by case and issue by issue, to develop the
law in accordance with its underlying principles. Thus, in addition to justifying the two-stage
process as a matter of  principle, we examine the state of  the law, showing how far the courts
have come towards this outcome and where there is still some way to go.
Recognising the two-stage process explicitly brings three advantages. First, failure to do
so results in an elision of  the different principles in each stage (for instance, judges treating
second-stage issues as purely contractual) which results in faulty reasoning and incorrect
outcomes. Second, it makes the law easier to apply because the character and applicable
rules of  each stage are better illustrated. Third, one can determine the outcome of  stage
two relatively easily and with a high degree of  certainty. While stage one is still inevitably
uncertain, by making it clear that some matters only apply to stage two, stage one becomes
a little more certain.
We begin in section 1 by considering the tension in the underlying principles and how
it can be resolved via a two-stage process. In section 2, we examine the different role of
contract law in each stage. Essentially, contractual doctrines can only be used when they are
compatible with fiduciary principles, which means the implication of  terms in fact only
works well in stage two. We continue in section 3 by showing how other contractual
principles are modified to make them compatible with fiduciary law, so they are apt for stage
two. Finally, in section 4, we conclude by showing how the framework we advance is easier
to apply and how it illuminates errors in judges’ reasoning and decisions.
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2     Eg Murad v Al-Saraj [2005] EWCA Civ 959, [2005] WTLR 1573 [74]; Boardman v Phipps [1967] 2 AC 46 (HL);
Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver [1967] AC 134, [1942] 1 All ER 378 (HL).
3     Boulting v Association of  Cinematograph, Television and Allied Technicians [1963] 2 QB 606 (CA) 636, 637.
4     Jennifer Payne, ‘Consent’ in Peter Birks and Arianna Pretto (eds), Breach of  Trust (Hart 2002) 297, citing Spellson
v George [1992] NSWLR 666 (NSWCA) 669. The other major piece on authorisation is Ying Khai Liew and
Charles Mitchell, ‘Beneficiaries’ Consent to Trustees’ Unauthorised Actions’ in Paul S Davies, Simon Douglas
and James Goudkamp (eds), Defences in Equity (Hart 2018).
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1 The two stages in principle
1.1 ONE STAGE OR TWO?
It is clear that fiduciary duties can arise not only in traditional fiduciary relationships (such
as agent–principal, trustee–beneficiary, solicitor–client and director–company), but also in
‘ad hoc’ relationships provided the right factors exist. Consider what the courts have said
about raising and scoping the duty of  loyalty. Most judgments proceed on the basis that, in
ad hoc cases, the terms of  the contract are important in some rather nebulous way. The
classic exposition is in Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corporation, which
illustrates this:
[I]t is the contractual foundation which is all important because it is the contract that
regulates the basic rights and liabilities of  the parties. The fiduciary relationship, if
it is to exist at all, must accommodate itself  to the terms of  the contract so that it
is consistent with, and conforms to, them. The fiduciary relationship cannot be
superimposed upon the contract in such a way as to alter the operation which the
contract was intended to have according to its true construction.5
This passage has been quoted in the stage two cases of  Northampton Regional Livestock Centre
Company Ltd v Cowling,6 Hilton v Barker Booth & Eastwood7 and Global Container Lines Ltd v
Bonyad Shipping Co (No 1)8 and the stage one cases of  Ranson v Customer Systems plc9 and Fujitsu
Services Ltd v IBM United Kingdom Ltd.10 Ranson was cited with approval by Lord Neuberger
MR in the stage two case of  Rossetti Marketing Ltd v Diamond Sofa Co Ltd.11 Further vague
statements can be seen, such as ‘[t]he precise scope of  [the duty of  loyalty] must be
moulded according to the nature of  the relationship’12 and the defendant’s ‘capacity to
make decisions . . . is inconsistent [with the existence of  a general fiduciary relationship]’.13
These dicta suggest a compendious single-stage process of  identifying a fiduciary duty
and its scope by considering a range of  factors. In Hospital Products, the High Court of
Australia identified some of  these, such as a relationship of  trust of  confidence, inequality
of  bargaining power and the absence of  arms-length contracting.14 The English cases have
further suggested an undertaking of  assumption of  responsibility and entrustment of
property, affairs, transactions or interests.15
Before considering the reasons for having two different stages, it is helpful to illustrate
them with some concrete facts. In University of  Nottingham v Fishel,16 a stage one case, the
question was to which interests of  his employer, if  any, Dr Fishel was responsible to as a
fiduciary. The scope of  his duty was determined by considering the many factors. Against
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5     (1984) 156 CLR 41 (HCA) 97.
6     [2014] EWHC 30 (QB) [180] this point not raised on appeal: [2015] EWCA Civ 651, [2016] PNLR 5. The
issue was disclosure, a stage two issue.
7     [2005] UKHL 8, [2005] 1 WLR 567 [30]. The issue was whether there was an implied term meaning disclosure
was not required.
8     [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 528 (QB) 546.
9     [2012] EWCA Civ 841, [2012] IRLR 769 [26].
10   [2014] EWHC 752 (TCC), [2014] 1 CLC 353 [123].
11   [2012] EWCA Civ 1021 [21].
12   New Zealand Netherlands Society ‘Oranje’ Inc v Kuys [1973] 1 WLR 1126 (PC) 1130.
13   Hospital Products (n 5) 98.
14   Ibid 69ff.
15   Peskin v Anderson [2001] BCC 874 (CA) [34] quoted in Sinclair Investment Holdings SA v Versailles Trade Finance
Ltd [2007] EWHC 915 (Ch), [2007] 2 All ER (Comm) 993 [79].
16   [2000] ICR 1462 (QB).
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the existence of  the duty of  loyalty stood his employer’s encouragement of  outside
consultancy and that he was merely an employee. In favour was the business-like structure
of  his academic unit and that he had a key role. The court held that he was subject to the
duty of  loyalty in managing a team of  embryologists for his employer.17 He should have
directed them to work for his employer, and so he incurred liability for using them for his
own personal benefit. Nonetheless, he was not under a fiduciary duty for work conducted
outside of  the UK, since he was not acting for his employer there.
In Ross River Ltd v Waveley Commercial Ltd,18 concerning both stages, the parties were joint
venturers so the prima facie position was that, in the absence of  agency or partnership, there
is no fiduciary duty.19 There was a fiduciary duty because Ross River ‘reposed a very high
degree of  trust’ in Waveley Commercial (the stage one issue).20 The key issue was under
what terms payment could be made without it being a breach of  fiduciary duty. The answer
was that it had to be in accordance with clause 10.5 of  the contract, providing that the
development profit be paid by the fiduciary to Ross River before it could pay itself  except:
(i) in respect of  proper expenses incurred; or (ii) with the agreement of  Ross River. This
was held to be consistent with the existence of  a fiduciary duty (in stage one),21 but
precluded a breach of  fiduciary duty provided Waveley Commercial kept to it (stage two).
The different character of  each enquiry is immediately apparent. Stage one is the
weighing of  a multitude of  factors. It looks to the contract because the terms of  the
contract can make out the factors the court looks to, particularly assumption of
responsibility. For instance, Dr Fishel’s overall responsibility was defined by a multitude of
terms. Conversely, stage two is a crystalline, sharply logical and ordered process.22 Here, the
terms of  the contract directly define the exceptions to the duty of  loyalty, as in Ross River,
and the parties’ intention, as expressed in the terms, has a much more direct effect on the
duty of  loyalty.
1.2 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
Now consider how the different characters of  each stage may be justified. We argue that
this arrangement is the result of  the resolution of  a tension between three conventional
fundamental principles of  fiduciary law. Provided one accepts the validity of  these
principles, the conclusion follows.23
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17   Ibid 1494.
18   [2013] EWCA Civ 910.
19   Crossco No 4 Unlimited v Jolan Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 1619, [2012] 2 All ER 754 [88]. See also Murad v Al-Saraj
[2004] EWHC 1235 (Ch) [325]–[341].
20   Ross River v Waveley (n 18) [39].
21   Ibid [40], [94].
22   John Rawls, A Theory of  Justice (Harvard University Press 2009) 36ff  uses the term ‘lexically ordered’.
23   They are conventional, but can be controverted. See, eg, John H Langbein, ‘Questioning the Trust Law Duty
of  Loyalty: Sole Interest or Best Interest?’ (2005) 114 Yale Law Journal 929; Lionel Smith, ‘Deterrence,
Prophylaxis and Punishment in Fiduciary Obligations’ (2013) 7 Journal of  Equity 87; Robert Flannigan, ‘The
Fiduciary Obligation’ (1989) 9 Oxford Journal of  Legal Studies 285; Ernest J Weinrib, ‘The Fiduciary
Obligation’ (1975) 25 University of  Toronto Law Journal 1; J E Penner, ‘Distinguishing Fiduciary, Trust, and
Accounting Relationships’ (2014) 8 Journal of  Equity 202; Lionel Smith, ‘The Motive, not the Deed’ in Joshua
Getzler (ed), Rationalizing Property, Equity and Trusts: Essays in Honour of  Edward Burn (LexisNexis 2003);
Stephen A Smith, ‘The Deed, not the Motive’ in Paul B Miller and Andrew S Gold (eds), Contract, Status, and
Fiduciary Law (Oxford University Press 2016); Matthew Conaglen, Fiduciary Loyalty: Protecting the Due Performance
of  Non-Fiduciary Duties (Hart 2011); Matthew Conaglen, ‘The Nature and Function of  Fiduciary Loyalty’
(2005) 121 Law Quarterly Review 452; Rebecca Lee, ‘In Search of  the Nature and Function of  Fiduciary
Loyalty: Some Observations on Conaglen’s Analysis’ (2007) 27 Oxford Journal of  Legal Studies 327.
244
The first fundamental principle of  fiduciary law is deterrence or prophylaxis. The duty
of  loyalty exists to protect the principal by deterring the fiduciary from the temptation to
put his or her interests ahead of  his or her duty or to make an unauthorised profit.24 It does
this by giving remedies over and above those that exist in the law of  contract, namely strict
liability to account for profits25 and susceptibility to rescission.26 By taking away the fruits
of  the breach – even if  the principal suffers no loss – the fiduciary is deterred from
pursuing it.27
The second is autonomy. In the mid-term authorisation case of  Boulting v Association of
Cinematography Television & Allied Technicians, it was said that:
[T]he person entitled to the benefit of  the rule may relax it, provided he is of  full
age and sui juris and fully understands not only what he is doing but also what
his legal rights are, and that he is in part surrendering them [If  so,] there is no
reason why he should not relax the rule, and it may commercially be very much
to his advantage to do so.28
It is trite that parties make bargains for their mutual benefit. If  the principal is sufficiently
appraised, considering all the circumstances, including his or her knowledge and
sophistication, the protective function of  fiduciary law is achieved without the need for the
duty of  loyalty itself.29 This would have been the case in Ross River, and it is only because
Waveley Commercial paid itself  outside of  the agreed strictures that it was liable. One can
also easily imagine that a director, with the knowledge and approval of  the company, might
offer it a good price for its property or an opportunity. As Chitty LJ said, ‘the real evil is not
the payment of  money, but the secrecy attending it’.30
The third is that the protective function must prevail. Fiduciary duties are of  course
voluntarily assumed – one cannot foist the duty of  loyalty on someone.31 The stage one
enquiry looks to whether sufficient responsibility has been assumed by the would-be
fiduciary. However, there are aspects of  the duty of  loyalty that do not respond directly to
the parties’ intentions and prevail over them. The duty of  loyalty has an ‘irreducible core’
that cannot be excluded no matter how hard the parties try.32 The core provides mandatory
rules, which are imposed in direct opposition to the express terms of  a contract, reflecting
the protective purpose of  the duty of  loyalty. This is common theme in equity, also seen in
the law of  mortgages and unconscionable bargains.33 This makes fiduciary duties hard to
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24   Bray v Ford [1896] AC 44 (HL).
25   Boardman v Phipps (n 2); Regal Hastings (n 2); Keech v Sandford (1726) Sel Cas Ch 61, 25 ER 223.
26   Aberdeen Railway Co v Blaikie Brothers (1854) 1 Macq 461, [1843–60] All ER Rep 249 (HL Sc).
27   Smith, ‘Deterrence, Prophylaxis and Punishment in Fiduciary Obligations’ (n 23) considers the difference
between deterrence and prophylaxis, but it is not material for present purposes.
28   (n 3) 636, 637. See also Re Pauling’s Settlement Trusts [1962] 1 WLR 86 (Ch) 108: ‘having given his concurrence,
[the beneficiary should not be able to sue] provided that he fully understands what he is concurring in’.
29   An argument also made by Matthew Conaglen, ‘Fiduciary Duties and Voluntary Undertakings’ (2013) 7
Journal of  Equity 105, 118. Conaglen of  course takes the position that the purpose of  fiduciary duties is to
ensure the proper performance of  non-fiduciary duties: Conaglen, Fiduciary Loyalty (n 23). Nonetheless, this
argument applies even if  one takes the purpose of  fiduciary duties to be the conventional one of  prophylaxis.
30   Shipway v Broadwood [1899] 1 QB 369 (CA) 373.
31   Hospital Products (n 5) 97; Williams v Central Bank of  Nigeria [2014] UKSC 10, [2014] AC 1189 [9]. A fiduciary
has power, trust and confidence reposed in him or her; there are no constructive fiduciaries: Lionel Smith,
‘Constructive Fiduciaries?’ in Peter Birks (ed), Privacy and Loyalty (Clarendon 1997).
32   Armitage v Nurse [1998] Ch 241 (CA) 253. See also Mark Leeming, ‘The Scope of  Fiduciary Obligations: How
Contract Informs, but does not Determine, the Scope of  Fiduciary Obligations’ (2009) 3 Journal of  Equity
181 for instances where the contract is not predominant.
33   G & C Kreglinger v New Patagonia Meat and Cold Storage Co Ltd [1914] AC 25 (HL) (‘clogs and fetters’ and the
mortgagee’s equity of  redemption); Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v Burch [1997] 1 All ER 144 (CA).
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conceptualise as contractual terms implied in fact because in contract law express terms
trump implied ones.34 Moreover, as Smith points out, the ability to modify an obligation
does not necessarily mean the modifier comes from the same source.35
This can be demonstrated by considering the core requirement of  disclosure.36 Consider
an engagement where the fiduciary is entitled to take fees or commissions on management
activities. While at common law it is perfectly possible to stipulate ‘a reasonable commission’
for subcontracting work, the details of  that commission must be disclosed in order to avoid
liability if  a fiduciary duty exists.37 This is perhaps the paradigm case of  how fiduciary law’s
norms override the intentions of  the parties. Unless there is sufficient disclosure, the
principal’s autonomy is impaired and the prophylactic remedies remain.
Exploring the possible outcomes to such an attempt demonstrates not only the
existence of  the irreducible core, but gives an early indication of  a principled need for two
stages. Consider, for example, a term providing that disclosure to the ‘principal’ is not
required and the ‘principal’ is to take independent advice. First, it could be that the
reduction in the duties of  the ‘fiduciary’ are such that the duty of  loyalty is wholly displaced
(in what we characterise as stage one). In Chan v Zacharia, Deane J suggested that ‘[i]t is
conceivable that the effect of  the provisions of  a particular partnership agreement . . . could
be that any fiduciary relationship between the partners is excluded’.38 Second and
alternatively, the courts could still find that there is a fiduciary relationship, and any
particular terms attempting to exclude the need for disclosure (or indeed another core facet
of  the duty of  loyalty) would be ineffective. A Canadian judge, Moore J, has said that ‘[t]he
fiduciary duty transcends these terms and it is abhorrent for contractual terms to abrogate
that duty’.39 Once the duty is owed, one cannot derogate from its irreducible core.
That is not to say that all terms will go this way. If  the term falls in the middle ground,
such that it is neither abhorrent to the duty of  loyalty (in stage one), it creates a limited
exception, reducing the scope of  the duty of  loyalty in part (in stage two). A very simple
example is a non-secret commission. If  the fiduciary stipulates a commission of  10 per
cent, this is perfectly legitimate. Taking more is clearly a breach of  fiduciary duty, so the duty
of  loyalty is not displaced altogether.
1.3 RESOLVING THE TENSION
The inevitable consequence of  the combination of  the protective function and the
irreducible core of  the duty of  loyalty is that, doctrinally, the process of  raising it simply
cannot be a sharply logical process of  applying crystalline, well-defined rules. Instead, using
Rose’s terminology, it must be a ‘muddy’ process of  determination.40 Rather than having a
set of  rules with results of  ‘yes’ or ‘no’, there are factors with answers of  ‘maybe’ or ‘maybe
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34   Eg Marks and Spencer plc v BNP Paribas Securities Services Trust Co (Jersey) Ltd [2015] UKSC 72, [2016] AC 742
[18].
35   Lionel D Smith, ‘Contract, Consent and Fiduciary Relationships’ in Paul B Miller and Andrew S Gold (eds),
Contract, Status, and Fiduciary Law (Oxford University Press 2016) 123ff. He gives the example of  contract
modifying tort obligations.
36   It is not a free-standing duty: Item Software (UK) Ltd v Fassihi [2004] EWCA Civ 1244, [2004] BCC 994.
37   If  the size of  the commission is a trade custom and the principal aware of  it, this is probably sufficient:
Hurstanger Ltd v Wilson [2007] EWCA Civ 299, [2007] 1 WLR 2351, [36]ff. See also Peter Watts, Bowstead and
Reynolds on Agency (20th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2016) para 6–086; the ‘half-secret commission’ in the example
may attract the remedy of  account of  profits but not rescission.
38   (1984) 154 CLR 178 (HCA) 196.
39   Penner v Yorkton Continental Securities Inc [1996] AWLD 456 (Alberta Court of  Queen’s Bench) [90].
40   Carol M Rose, ‘Crystals and Mud in Property Law’ (1988) 40 Stanford Law Review 577.
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not’. The discussion of  Fishel is a good illustration of  this.41 It can also be called a ‘multi-
factorial’ or ‘range of  factors’ approach, terminology used in the doctrines of  frustration,42
illegality,43 mitigation44 and the common intention constructive trust.45 It is thought to be
generally applicable where the question is whether there is an assumption of
responsibility.46
There are two reasons why a multi-factorial approach is required. The first is
flexibility. If  one adopts crystalline rules to determine questions of  determination of
responsibility, the risk of  being driven to unsatisfactory outcomes by those rules or
having excessively complicated rules to avoid such outcomes becomes a likelihood. This
was the case in the doctrine of  illegality, where, after a series of  unsatisfactory cases, a
majority of  the Supreme Court eventually adopted a multi-factorial approach to avoid this
problem in Patel v Mirza.47 Moreover, in the context of  frustration, it is said that
determining the allocation of  risk (which is quite like responsibility) was not simply a
matter of  express or implied provision, but something that takes in ‘less easily defined
matters such as “the contemplation of  the parties”’.48
The second is to uphold a standard. Responsibility is always to a certain standard, and
when standards are to be upheld, one sees terms such as ‘reasonable care’, ‘satisfactory
quality’ or ‘good reason’. Holding a person to a standard and not merely a checklist of  rules
inherently favours muddy rules over crystalline ones. It means holding that person to the
spirit as well as the letter of  the law, but if  this is to be legally enforceable, it is the spirit and
not the letter that must be binding. If  it were the letter – which it would be if  the
determination were a series of  tests with yes/no answers – there would be a considerable
danger of  imaginative contracting-out or working-around.49 Given the vulnerability of  the
principal, this is all the more important. This muddy rules approach, as Rose points out, is
very much in the spirit of  Holmes’ ‘bad man’.50 Judges have constantly justified fiduciary
duties as responding to the realities of  ‘human nature’ or ‘human infirmity’.51 The process
of  raising the duty of  loyalty must therefore take this approach.
Curiously, the same premise, that we must plan for the ‘bad man’ fiduciary, leads to the
different conclusion that stage two must be crystalline. A simple economic and behavioural
argument is that, unless parties can be sufficiently sure of  their responsibilities, they will not
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41   Above, text from n 16.
42   Edwinton Commercial Corp v Tsavliris Russ (Worldwide Salvage & Towage) Ltd (The Sea Angel) [2007] EWCA Civ 547,
[2007] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 517 [111].
43   Patel v Mirza [2016] UKSC 42, [2017] AC 467 [83], [107].
44   LSREF III Wight Ltd v Gateley LLP [2016] EWCA Civ 359, [2016] PNLR 21 [38].
45   Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53, [2012] 1 AC 776 [61].
46   Transfield Shipping Inc v Mercator Shipping Inc (The Achilleas) [2008] UKHL 48, [2009] 1 AC 61 [93] (Lady Hale).
47   Patel v Mirza (n 43). Cf  the very complex crystalline approach, putting exception upon exception, proposed by
Lord Sumption in the minority. See Paul S Davies, ‘The Illegality Defence: Turning Back the Clock’ [2010]
Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 282 in addition to Patel for further illustrations of  the problems.
48   The Sea Angel (n 42) [111]. The matter of  allocation of  risk was key in Davis Contractors Ltd v Fareham UDC
[1956] AC 696 (HL) 743.
49   Rose (n 40) 592–93; Rawls (n 22) 36ff; H L A Hart, The Concept of  Law (Oxford University Press 2012) 131ff;
Duncan Kennedy, ‘Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication’ (1976) 89 Harvard Law Review 1685;
George P Fletcher, ‘The Right and the Reasonable’ (1984) 98 Harvard Law Review 949, 962ff; cf  Bruce
Chapman, ‘Law, Incommensurability, and Conceptually Sequenced Argument’ (1997) 146 University of
Pennsylvania Law Review 1487. Chapman’s counter-proposal requires the use of  weights to facilitate a more
ordered, crystalline approach, which are suspiciously malleable, like factors.
50   Rose (n 40) 592; Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law (Little, Brown & Co 1881).
51   Eg Bray v Ford (n 24) 51; Keech v Sandford (n 25); Ex p Bennett (1805) 10 Ves Jun 381, 394; 32 ER 893, 897.
247
contract. If  there is a risk of  a party becoming a fiduciary, that party needs to be sure of
what to do so that he or she will still gain a benefit from the engagement without the risk
of  losing it all via the account of  profits remedy. While the ‘bad man’ cannot be allowed to
evade his responsibility, he must be allowed to know where he stands. This is all the more
important when the remedy of  account of  profits might give the principal a windfall in such
cases, something the courts are wary of  doing.52 This means crystalline, or at least
sufficiently crystalline, rules are required. Then, since stage one cannot have crystalline
rules, we are driven to the conclusion that there must be a separate stage, which can.
Nonetheless, that is as far as it goes. It does not follow from this argument that
authorising terms, such as clause 10.5, are paramount, even if  they are agreed by both
parties. The argument does not displace the need for the dominance of  fiduciary principles.
The most one can say is that the precise terms agreed are applied in a crystalline way in stage
two when fiduciary principles make that possible and not otherwise. Granted, this may not
fully resolve the tension, but it must greatly reduce it.
This leads to the key question of  the role of  contractual doctrines in stages one and two.
The argument thus far goes only to the character of  the rules. It does not mandate the
presence or absence of  contractual doctrine in either, despite these early indications. There
are two strands to explore in answering this question: normative and descriptive.
Respectively, we consider the role contract law could have in principle and to what extent
the courts have adopted it in practice.
2 The role of contract law
2.1 A COMPATIBLE ROLE FOR CONTRACT
To determine the role of  contractual doctrines in creating and scoping the duty of  loyalty,
one must determine its role both in its home field – interpretation and the implication of
terms in fact in the law of  contract – as well as in fiduciary law. This is for two reasons. The
first is because it might be thought that, even in a two-stage process, the creation of  the
duty of  loyalty is a form of  contractual implication, as Edelman has suggested.53 The
second is because, if  this is not the case, implication is indeed used in the cases and this
must be explained.54
The view that implied terms create and scope the duty of  loyalty is, at first blush,
attractive, because if  the duty of  loyalty can be scoped by the terms of  the contract, one
rather suspects they can create it too. Then, contract law and fiduciary law are similar in
purpose, divided only by doctrine but ultimately doing the same things.55 Moreover, by
confirming that ad hoc fiduciary duties can be created from contracts in addition to arising
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 70(2)
52   See, eg, Sinclair Investments (UK) Ltd v Versailles Trade Finance Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 347, [2012] Ch 453 [47];
Murad v Al-Saraj (n 2) [82].
53   James Edelman, ‘When do Fiduciary Duties Arise?’ (2010) 126 Law Quarterly Review 302. See also James
Edelman, ‘The Role of  Status in the Law of  Obligations’ in Andrew S Gold and Paul B Miller (eds),
Philosophical Foundations of  Fiduciary Law (Oxford University Press 2014); John H Langbein, ‘The Contractarian
Basis of  the Law of  Trusts’ (1995) 105 Yale Law Journal 625, 631: ‘the contractarian character of  the trust is
transparent’; Frank H Easterbrook and Daniel R Fischel, ‘Contract and Fiduciary Duty’ (1993) 36 Journal of
Law and Economics 425; Henry N Butler and Larry E Ribstein, ‘Opting out of  Fiduciary Duties: A Response
to the Anti-Contractarians’ (1990) 65 Washington Law Review 1; Robert H Sitkoff, ‘The Economic Structure
of  Fiduciary Law’ (2011) 91 Boston University Law Review 1039.
54   Kelly v Cooper (n 1); see also Hilton v BBE (n 7); Rossetti (n 11); Northampton Livestock [2014] EWHC 30 (QB).
55   Edelman, ‘When do Fiduciary Duties Arise?’ (n 53) 303 also notes they deal with the same difficult remedial
issues.
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from ‘status’ – being in one of  the standard fiduciary relations – Hospital Products supports,
to some extent, this view.56
However, there are two main difficulties. The first is that, because of  the irreducible
core and the dominance of  fiduciary principles, sometimes the implied term will need to
prevail over express terms to the contrary in order to create the irreducible core.57 The
second is that a term will not be implied in fact unless it is necessary for the business
efficacy of  the agreement58 or it goes without saying,59 and it is sufficiently certain.60 Terms
will not be implied simply because it is reasonable to do so, even if  this would reflect the
intentions of  the parties.61 Fiduciary duties are rarely necessary for the contract to function.
For instance, the buyer of  a hotel still got the hotel despite the purchasing agent taking a
secret commission, which merely drove up the price.62
There was once a possible route around these problems. For a brief  period following A-
G of  Belize v Belize Telecom Ltd,63 it was thought that the doctrine of  terms implied in fact
had been expanded considerably such that the necessity requirement had been diluted.64 In
this case, Lord Hoffmann characterised the process of  implying a term in fact as a form of
contractual interpretation (or construction) where the ultimate purpose of  the exercise was
to convert the common intentions of  the parties into contractual terms and therefore this
function could take precedence over merely doctrinal requirements such as necessity.65 One
might also speculate that this expansion may have permitted implied terms to prevail over
express ones. Edelman expressly relied on this in making his argument that the duty of
loyalty was implied in fact as though a contractual term.66
However, any travel in this direction was reversed by the Supreme Court case of  Marks
and Spencer plc v BNP Paribas Securities Services Trust Co (Jersey) Ltd. It was ‘wrong in law’ to say
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60   Marks & Spencer v Baird Textiles Holdings Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 274, [2002] 1 All ER (Comm) 737.
61   Liverpool City Council v Irwin [1977] AC 239 (HL).
62   FHR European Ventures LLP v Cedar Capital Partners LLC [2014] UKSC 45, [2015] AC 250.
63   [2009] UKPC 10, [2009] 1 WLR 1988.
64   F&C Alternative Investments (Holdings) Ltd v Barthelemy (No 2) [2011] EWHC 1731 (Ch), [2012] Ch 613 [225]:
‘There are similarities between the reasoning by which terms may be implied into a contract and the way in
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Ltd [2012] EWHC 2487 (Ch), [243]. For commentary, see Gerard McMeel, ‘The Rise of  Commercial
Construction in Contract Law’ [1998] Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 382; Sir Christopher
Staughton, ‘How do Courts Interpret Commercial Contracts’ (1999) 58 Cambridge Law Journal 303; Richard
Buxton, ‘“Construction” and Rectification after Chartbrook’ (2010) 69 Cambridge Law Journal 253; David
McLauchlan, ‘The Lingering Confusion and Uncertainty in the Law of  Contract Interpretation’ [2015] Lloyd’s
Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 406. Even those who emphasise the fact that Lord Hoffmann did
not introduce new principles of  construction accept the change of  emphasis, eg, Lord Bingham of  Cornhill,
‘A New Thing under the Sun? The Interpretation of  Contract and the ICSDecision’ (2008) 12 Edinburgh Law
Review 374. See Kim Lewison, The Interpretation of  Contracts (5th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2011) para 1.01ff.
65   Belize Telecom (n 63) [18]. It is possible to cleave a distinction between construction and interpretation (see J W
Courtney and Wayne Carter, ‘Belize Telecom: A Reply to Professor McLauchlan’ [2015] Lloyd’s Maritime and
Commercial Law Quarterly 245, 248ff), but we take them to mean the same thing).
66   Edelman, ‘When do Fiduciary Duties Arise?’ (n 53) 317.
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Belize Telecom had expanded the jurisdiction of  the courts to imply terms.67 The process of
interpretation has limits,68 and a term will not be implied unless it is necessary for the
contract to function.69 The foundation for Edelman’s argument has been swept away.
Most importantly, the fall of  Belize Telecom prompted a reconsideration of  what these
contractual doctrines are for. Carter and Courtney propose that the contractual
construction of  terms is internally structured and has three aspects: (1) to apply the
requirements of  certain contract doctrines; (2) to rebut a presumption of  intention; and (3)
the interpretative function.70 Function (1) is extensible to non-contractual doctrines such as
fiduciary law. Call that function (1B). Carter and Courtney consider that Lord Hoffmann’s
approach elevated the interpretative function above the others.71 Upon its retrenchment, it
is back in the right role, feeding into other doctrines rather than supplanting them.72 We
must consider how they might work with fiduciary law, but, first, consider a brief
examination of  how they work with contractual implication, both to illustrate Carter and
Courtney’s framework, but also as a preliminary step in assessing the compatibility of
contractual implication with fiduciary law.
The third function needs no introduction. We must interpret what the parties mean
before their intentions can be applied in any respect. The second is not relevant for present
purposes. The first is precisely in point and describes the role for interpretation in doctrines
where more than mere interpretation is required. Consider The Moorcock. The parties agreed
to moor the claimant’s ship at the defendant’s jetty. The question was whether a term could
be implied providing the dock be deep enough. The interpretative function had little work
to do here. It was the particular doctrine of  implication in fact that was in play:
[T]he law is raising an implication from the presumed intention of  the parties with
the object of  giving, to the transaction such efficacy as both parties must have
intended that at all events it should have.73
The real work is being done by the legal rules in function (1) – a ‘presumed intention’ that
may not recognise actual intention (even if  a common intention) and a requirement that any
implied term is necessary for the efficacy of  the contract. The interpretative function is
filtered by this rule of  law and subordinate to it.
Thus, at a high level of  abstraction, this conventional theoretical role for interpretation
fits the non-contractual doctrine of  raising and scoping the duty of  loyalty. The terms of
the contract, interpreted using the usual contractual approaches, go into the two stages. In
the first stage, they are applied in the multi-factorial approach of  determining if  one party
has assumed fiduciary responsibilities. In the second, they are applied to reduce those
fiduciary obligations.
Difficulties may occur at a lower level of  abstraction. At stage one this is unlikely, for two
reasons. First, an implied term is unlikely to make a material difference to the multi-factorial
enquiry. It is just one factor among many and, since it was derived from the same source as
the other factors, it will point the same way. Second, there is little chance of  problems with
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67   (n 34) [31], [69].
68   Ibid [29], [31].
69   Ibid [21], [23].
70   J W Carter and Wayne Courtney, ‘Unexpressed Intention and Contract Construction’ (2017) 37 Oxford
Journal of  Legal Studies 326, 334.
71   Ibid 355.
72   For another critique of  contract being called to do more than it is suitable for in another context, see Margaret
Jane Radin, ‘The Deformation of  Contract in the Information Society’ (2017) 37 Oxford Journal of  Legal
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the logic. With sharply logical rules, each with a yes/no answer, the correctness of  the result
depends on them all being correct. In the multi-factorial first stage, if  the interpretative
function or any other rule gives a wrong result, that is just one factor of  many and, when
weighing them all up, the judge can take that into account and explain it away with a new
factor accordingly. Implication is therefore broadly irrelevant to stage one.
Consider, then, how contractual terms would work in stage two. Recall how they cannot
displace all fiduciary obligations. We now sharpen our proposal: stage two is the application
of  the usual contractual doctrines, interpretation and implication, and then any relevant
fiduciary principles afterwards. This is the simplest process that comports with the underlying
principles and takes into account the existence of  the contract. It allows the detailed terms
of  the contract to determine the precise scope of  the authorisation, and then fiduciary
principles are applied thereafter to ensure it meets fiduciary standards, rejecting them if  not.
The complication is that the contractual terms that feed into this stage could be both
express and implied. For express terms, there is no difficulty. The express terms will reduce
the duty of  loyalty provided they do not conflict with the overriding fiduciary principles.
Implied terms are more troublesome. If  the law uses the contractual doctrine of  implied
terms, it is relying on both the interpretative function, the particular doctrine of  contract law
(namely implication) and then a subsequent fiduciary doctrine – functions (3), then (1) and then
(1B) rather than (3) then (1B). While interpretation is relatively unobtrusive, implication is
much more so in that it contains contractual principles and norms, particularly the necessity
test, which was not designed to work harmoniously with fiduciary law.
However, it so happens that, at stage two, the same principle of  necessity is apt in
fiduciary law. In contract law, one function of  the necessity requirement is to act as a proxy
for evidence of  the parties’ true intentions in order to allow the court to be confident74 the
implied term was indeed intended.75 It is relatively safe to take a party to have agreed to
something if  it is necessary for the engagement to function. In fiduciary law, the
requirement is that the fiduciary be restrained from committing a disloyal act. If, however,
that act is necessary for the engagement to function, then it can hardly be considered
disloyal. It may be that ‘necessity’ must be construed more restrictively, but, in broad terms,
it is the right basis. The flip-side is that, because the test is notionally the same, it is easy to
forget that its purpose is not, and additional steps may be needed to fulfil that purpose.
Rather surprisingly then, the conventional doctrine of  terms implied in fact turns out to
be compatible with fiduciary law. At stage one, it does nothing of  substance. But at stage
two, it is suitable for use as one of  that stage’s sharply logical rules.
2.2 AUTHORITY FOR THE ROLE OF CONTRACT
Nonetheless, having established their compatibility, we must now establish a positive case
for the reception of  contractual interpretation and implication as the input to an ultimately
fiduciary process in stage two. Otherwise, the argument that stage two should be wholly
non-contractual would stand unopposed and our framework would be of  purely academic
interest. Certainly, mid-term authorisation does not necessarily have to be contractual; it can
even be by conduct alone.76
There are indeed a significant number of  authorities where it has. This supports our
claim that the courts are edging towards the two-stage framework. Consider first the
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proposition that stage two is indeed a form of  authorisation. This is essential if  one is to
be able to draw from the wider body of  authorisation case law to see how contractual
authorisation would work and indeed to rebut the argument that stage two is purely
contractual.
There is apparently no direct authority to this effect. Most cases are concerned with the
quotidian task of  determining whether the disclosure had been sufficient, sometimes at
great length.77 However, some authorities do indeed see authorisation as an umbrella
doctrine that takes different forms. In Lewin on Trusts, it is claimed that the rules of
authorisation for making a profit from one’s office are the same as those for trustees dealing
with trust property for their own benefit.78 In Knight v Frost, Hart J applied dicta from Re
Pauling’s Settlement Trusts that, following analysis of  the nineteenth-century trusts cases,
concluded that the same test of  consent applies to company cases where the fiduciary is a
director.79 These are all mid-term cases. However, the underlying instrument may expressly
or impliedly authorise a conflict in settlement trusts80 and will trusts,81 which are not. It
goes little further to say the underlying authorising instrument could be the contract
creating the fiduciary duty too. More to the point, the outcome of  inductive reasoning is
clear: the simplest way of  reconciling these authorities is to see authorisation as a general
doctrine, applying to all fiduciaries, whether at the outset or mid-term.
Consider now support for the proposition that contractual doctrines then feed into the
fiduciary doctrines in the (3)/(1)/(1B) sequence. In Bank of  Credit and Commerce International
SA v Ali (concerning a release from contractual liability), it was said that there is no separate
equitable doctrine of  construction.82 While the absoluteness of  this proposition can be
doubted (and on this, see section 3), the differences appear to be only contextual and the
fundamentals of  interpretation are the same. The contractual principles of  interpretation have
been applied in the context of  certainty of  intention of  trusts,83 to interpret provisions as
to the identity of  the subject matter84 and to determine the rules of  pension schemes
(which are trusts).85 The scope of  the authorisation, again at least for trusts, is a matter of
construction.86 Finally, in Sargeant v National Westminster Bank plc the court indeed went on
to apply fiduciary principles after construing the relevant clauses.87
Consider now implied terms. They tend to appear in cases where a fiduciary acts for
multiple principals where the permission to do so is not spelled out expressly. Then, it is a
difficult and contentious issue as to whether such a term is implied. In Kelly v Cooper, the
issue was that an estate agent (and fiduciary) sold two houses, belonging to different sellers
(and principals), to the same buyer. The houses were adjacent and the obvious inference was
that the buyer was particularly interested in them for that reason. One can infer that a higher
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price might have been obtained as a consequence. The claimant seller’s arguments were that
non-disclosure of  this information was a breach of  fiduciary duty, as was the conflict of
interest in obtaining a surer commission on both sales over the risk of  losing one or both
in the process of  negotiating and trying to drive the prices up.
The Privy Council rejected these arguments, holding that ‘like every other contract, the
rights and duties of  the principal and agent are dependent upon the terms of  the contract
between them, whether express or implied’.88 The necessity requirement applied: ‘despite
this conflict of  interest, [residential] estate agents must be free to act for several competing
principals otherwise they will be unable to perform their function’.89 A term permitting it
was implied accordingly. Similarly, in Hilton v Barker Booth & Eastwood, Lord Walker made
express reference to the traditional tests for implied terms.90
The necessity requirement makes the availability of  such terms very limited. Such a term
could also apply to investment intermediaries, who often act for multiple principals.91 The
fiduciary would still be constrained by any other duties; the authorisation is narrow in
scope.92 Permission to act for multiple principals is as far as it goes.93 Such a term would
not permit the fiduciary to act in a manner that conflicts with his or her principal’s
interests94 or for multiple principals in the same transaction.95 Moreover, in Hilton, Lord
Walker said that the proposition that one breach of  duty owed to one principal could
exonerate a breach of  a duty owed to another ‘seems contrary to common sense and
justice’.96 In Rossetti Marketing Ltd v Diamond Sofa Company Ltd, Lord Neuberger MR noted
that, whilst a residential estate agent must be free to act for multiple principals, the same
could not be said for an agent who sold furniture.97 Most recently, in Northampton Regional
Livestock Centre Company Ltd v Cowling, the judge noted that an implied term permitting the
individual to act for conflicting principals was only available in situations where such
multiple undertakings were inherent to the business.98
In these cases, while one sees examples of  how the necessity requirement in the doctrine
of  implied terms is aligned with the necessity requirement of  fiduciary law, one also sees
unease about going too far. At stage two, even for contractually created fiduciary duties,
fiduciary principles are still paramount. This suggests a narrower interpretation of  necessity
may be appropriate for fiduciary authorisation, where the necessity goes to the necessity of
the authorisation rather than merely the business efficacy of  the arrangement.
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3 Four key rules of contractual authorisation
Stage two should therefore be called contractual authorisation.99 In this section, we
summarise and expand the main rules of  contractual authorisation, drawing on and
expanding the rules in the case law for contractual and mid-term authorisation and taking
into account the similarities and differences. We identify four key rules. While not an
exhaustive list, these are the most important because of  the frequency at which they come
up and because they interact with contract law doctrines. This shows the extent to which
the framework has gained a foothold in the authorities and the pitfalls to avoid.
3.1 SUFFICIENCY OF DISCLOSURE AND AUTONOMY
It bears repeating: the first key rule of  contractual authorisation is that the intention of  the
parties, ascertained through the conventional contractual interpretation and implication
processes, is only accepted as effective authorisation if  there is sufficient disclosure. As
noted above, this requires the provision of  enough information such that the principal can
make a fully informed decision. Then, the principal’s autonomy is respected and the
protective function of  fiduciary law is achieved without the need for the duty of  loyalty.100
The courts have been concerned with fleshing out what is sufficient, which is summarised
here. There is also one key difference between mid-term and contractual authorisation that
warrants exploring: in mid-term authorisation, the engagement is already on foot.
In general, and in accordance with the rigour of  fiduciary law, the courts have been strict
in their requirements in the mid-term cases. There must be ‘full and frank disclosure of  all
material facts’.101 The principal ‘must be honestly acquainted with all the material
circumstances of  the case’102 and ‘fully understand[] what he is concurring in’.103 Not only
the existence of  the interest, but also its extent, must be disclosed.104 There must be no
suppressio veri or suggestio falsi, the consent must be clear and must not be obtained through
pressure.105 For company directors, disclosure must be to the board,106 but also to those
independent of  the transaction if  necessary. Disclosure to a boardroom dominated by those
with interests in the transaction is insufficient, and then disclosure to shareholders would be
necessary.107 It has also been said any information that may affect the decision to proceed
must be disclosed.108
The quotations hint that the requirement is subjective, not objective, meaning that the
particular principal must have been sufficiently appraised. It is not enough that a
hypothetical ‘reasonable principal’ in his or her position would have been. For example, a
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retail investor would be less well-versed in the risks associated with a particular investment
than an institutional investor and would have to be given more information. The dicta in
Boulting also suggest the test is subjective109 and, in Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty
Ltd, the High Court of  Australia placed great weight on these considerations.110
Kelly v Cooper is further authority for the subjectivity requirement. That case was decided
as it was because ‘their Lordships [were] of  the view that . . . the plaintiff  was well aware that
the defendants would be acting also for other vendors’.111 But some cases are less emphatic.
In Rossetti, Lord Neuberger said that ‘residential estate agents could not sensibly carry out
their function if  the normal conflict rule applied, and any person instructing an estate agent
must appreciate that fact’.112 This could be construed as laying down an objective
requirement, as not distinguishing between an objective and subjective requirement, or as a
by-the-by observation. In Hurstanger Ltd v Wilson the distinction does not appear to have
been in point, and the judgment does not consider it.113
Since contractual authorisation is a form of  the general doctrine of  authorisation, these
requirements still apply. It is important not to forget them and take the contractual terms
as conclusive. This will be in issue where fiduciaries attempt to exclude liability by stipulating
that they aim their explanations at a more sophisticated level or, more bluntly, that only
limited or no disclosure at all is required.
Consider now the difference in timing. Greater disclosure will often be required for mid-
term authorisation outside the original contract than authorisation in that contract. This is
a consequence of  the fact that the equitable duty of  loyalty has a more relational quality
than the law of  contract.114 Unlike in a simple transactional agreement, in a long-term
engagement the timing of  any such agreement and disclosure matters. As time goes on, the
information asymmetry problem will worsen as the fiduciary gains more information that
might not be passed on to the principal. Moreover, after performance of  the engagement
has begun and money has been sunk into it, there will be greater pressure to cooperate in
order to keep the agreement alive and avoid wasting those costs.115 Conversely, before the
agreement is concluded, the principal still has the opportunity to bargain for better terms,
demand more information, consider other business partners and walk away if  unsatisfied
with the deal on offer.
As an illustration, consider again the case of  Ross River, where clause 10.5 spelled out the
narrow circumstances in which Waveley Commercial could pay itself. The Court of  Appeal
held this term was sufficient to reduce the duty of  loyalty within its narrow parameters. Now
consider what the outcome would be if  there had been no such term and instead Waveley
Commercial had invited its principal to authorise such a payment after the conclusion of  the
contract. Unless they had been suitably informed of  how commercially advantageous this
was to Waveley Commercial, sufficient disclosure may not have been made and payment,
even within the specified parameters, may have been a breach of  fiduciary duty.
How contractual terms determine fiduciary duties: a two-stage process
109  Above, text to n 28.
110  [2007] HCA 22, (2007) 230 CLR 89 [107].
111  (n 1) 215 (emphasis added).
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114  T T Arvind, ‘Contract, Transactions and Equity’ in L A Di Matteo et al (eds), Commercial Contract Law:
Transatlantic Perspectives (Cambridge University Press 2013); Scott FitzGibbon, ‘Fiduciary Relationships are not
Contracts’ (1999) 82 Marquette Law Review 303.
115  See, eg, Richard A Posner, Economic Analysis of  Law (9th edn, Aspen 2011) 9 for an economic analysis of  ‘sunk
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3.2 BURDEN OF PROOF
The second key rule of  contractual authorisation concerns the burden of  proof. At the first
stage, the principal must adduce evidence that makes out the factors that lead to the
imposition of  the duty of  loyalty. That stage is even-handed in the sense that no
presumptions are made against the defendant because it is not yet established that he or she
is a fiduciary. While there are apparently no direct statements to this effect in the authorities,
there is a conspicuous absence of  presumptions against the would-be fiduciary, and there is
even-handed consideration of  the relevant factors.116 More positive support can be derived
from the courts’ attitude that the duty of  loyalty should not be imposed instrumentally; in
A-G v Blake Jonathan Cape Ltd (Third Party) the Court of  Appeal said that ‘[f]iduciary duties
should not be superimposed on those common law duties simply to improve the nature or
extent of  the remedy’.117
At the second stage, however, the burden of  proof  shifts. This is because of  the
evidential uncertainties and the inherently stronger position of  the fiduciary. It is the only
way to respect the autonomy of  the principal given the information asymmetries between
fiduciary and principal and thus uphold the aim of  fiduciary law. For mid-term
authorisation, this matter has been long settled.118 For contractual authorisation, the reverse
burden of  proof  was made explicit in Ross River Ltd v Waveley Commercial Ltd.119 Lloyd LJ,
with whom Fulford and Mummery LJJ agreed, held that:
[I]f  a fiduciary duty exists at all, it throws the burden on the party subject to the
duty to justify any payment in any case where there is any doubt as to whether it
was properly made.120
This is another instance where the norms of  fiduciary law coincidentally match those of
contract law; in contract law it is for the propounder of  the implied term to prove it.121 More
to the point, however, is how the shifting burden precisely reflects the two different stages.
3.3 DOUBTS RESOLVED AGAINST THE FIDUCIARY
It further follows that only a conservative form of  interpretation will respect the principal’s
autonomy. The third key rule is then that any doubts or uncertainties in the agreement as
to the scope of  the fiduciary duty must be resolved against the fiduciary. This is the
contractual principle of  contra proferentem, where uncertainty is resolved against the profferer.
On the facts of  the fiduciary–principal relationship where the fiduciary is accused of  a
breach of  fiduciary duty, this uncertainty will always be resolved against the fiduciary.
There are apparently no mid-term authorisation cases where this has been applied
terribly clearly, but a few old cases could be interpreted to support the application of  contra
proferentem.122 Where there was undue influence, the court would not rely on concurrence
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‘fished out from a loose expression in a letter’.123 Where the circumstances were suspicious,
only the clearest evidence would do.124 However, in cases of  authorisation from the start
the courts have expressly applied contra proferentem. This has been where clauses in the trust
deed have attempted to exonerate trustees or limit their liability for breach of  trust125 and
breach of  fiduciary duty.126
There are two issues to consider: the survival of  contra proferentem and its compatibility.
It is clear that the contra proferentem rule is in something of  a decline in the law of  contract.127
However, it does appear to have a future, albeit a limited one. In the recent Court of  Appeal
case of  Persimmon Homes Ltd v Ove Arup and Partners Ltd, it was said that it still has a role
where there is a power imbalance.128 Fiduciary relations are probably the paradigm case of
a power imbalance, and so the continuing existence of  contra proferentem seems secure here.
As for compatibility, the rule is already context-sensitive. This was observed in Bogg v
Raper, where Millett LJ noted that it had two aspects. Contra proferentem requires one both to
construe against the party relying on the clause, and also against the author of  the
instrument. For contracts, the two aspects are aligned, but for trusts this is not usually the
case.129 There is no reason, therefore, that contra proferentem cannot be retained and adapted
so it is compatible in stage two.
Two adaptations are required. First, since authorisation looks to the subjective, any
terms should be construed with this in mind. The interpretation must be within the range
of  reasonable interpretations of  the authorisation this particular principal actually decided
to grant. It must take into account the information asymmetry problem – the principal will
know less of  the background information, and the words must be interpreted accordingly.
Second, there is the relational nature of  a fiduciary engagement, which endures longer
than most transactional contracts. One must construe any reducing clause narrowly, with a
view to the many possible futures of  the engagement and permit the fiduciary the minimum
possible. This is best illustrated with the case of  the company director. Directors usually
have uncircumscribed fiduciary duties because they take responsibility for all possible
interests of  the company with no specific direction on how the outcome should be
achieved.130 The scope of  the duty is set at the time of  the initial engagement, namely the
appointment of  the director, yet any change in circumstances will not be known until later.
It would be impossible to start with a fine-tuned duty of  loyalty that covers such future
events unless they are expressly and very clearly defined.
3.4 HONESTY, GOOD FAITH AND NEGLIGENCE
The fourth key rule is that any fiduciary duty-reducing terms are subject to the requirements
of  honesty and good faith, not something generally found in the law of  contract. It is clear
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from the case law that these requirements can persist even where self-interest has been
permitted.131 This means the authorisation would not cover acts that require the exercise
of  discretion unless that discretion is exercised honestly and without self-interest. While
Millett LJ said ‘[a] servant who loyally does his incompetent best for his master is not
unfaithful’,132 the flip-side is that a fiduciary who deliberately acts against his or her
principal very much is.
The case law on this matter is relatively rare. Since it requires a discretion, it comes up
most often in trusts cases. One non-trusts case, regarding disclosure, is Industrial Development
Consultants Ltd v Cooley, where the director’s release from liability was vitiated because he had
dishonestly represented that he was in ill health.133 It was a trusts case, Armitage v Nurse,
where the general rule was laid down. The trustee may be excused from all liability except
that caused by his or her fraud or dishonesty. Millett LJ held that dishonesty:
. . . connotes at the minimum an intention on the part of  the trustee to pursue a
particular course of  action, either knowing that it is contrary to the interests of
the beneficiaries or being recklessly indifferent whether it is contrary to their
interests or not.134
While this test is commonly applied to the selection of  investments,135 it could well be
applied to a fiduciary joint venture. In the absence of  a suitable reported case, consider this
hypothetical. Suppose there is a term providing that a fiduciary joint venturer ‘is wholly
entitled to “highly speculative” drilling opportunities where, in its opinion and such opinion
is final, the chance of  striking oil is less than 50 per cent’. The fiduciary would only have to
honestly believe the chance was less than 50 per cent under that definition. The subjective
‘own opinion’ provision would displace the contractual duty to evaluate such opportunities
with reasonable care and skill (an objective standard).
This has given rise to much criticism, including judicial dissent.136 For professional
trustees the test was modified in Walker v Stones, but only so far, such that, if  no reasonable
trustee would have considered their actions in the interests of  the beneficiaries, this too
would be outside the exemption clause.137 This makes the test objective. This would mean
that the hypothetical exclusion clause would not be effective. It follows, perhaps
surprisingly, from Walker v Stones, that a non-excludable duty to act with reasonable care and
skill – a true negligence standard – is fixed upon professional trustees, and by extension,
professional fiduciaries. One may quibble about whether a certain class of  person is
‘professional’ for these purposes, but, if  Walker v Stones applies, that is the result.
At first blush, this seems wrong. Investment and management decisions are ordinarily
not fiduciary in character. They ought, therefore, to be subject to non-fiduciary norms, and
thus liability for breach ought to be subject to exclusion except when the breach is dishonest
(and therefore takes on a fiduciary character). The surprising outcome is that in the
authorisation stage a negligent fiduciary decision may well be a breach of  fiduciary duty no
matter what any authorising terms provide for. Nonetheless, given the controversy over this
standard, judicial revision of  it would not be unexpected.
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4 Application and utility of the two-stage approach
Finally, we aim to demonstrate the practical utility of  the two-stage framework. One can
look to taxonomy scholarship to identify relevant benchmarks. That scholarship suggests
that certainty in the law and the reduction of  costs is important,138 as is ease of  use,
facilitating a critical overview to assist the analysis of  the underlying field of  law itself  and
providing normative guidance for decision-makers.139 A critical overview has already been
provided. As for the other matters, we show here how the two-stage framework makes the
law easier to apply and errors harder to make and easier to spot.
The scenarios that come up most often are fiduciary joint ventures and directors’
releases from liability. There are not many terribly relevant reported cases. However, this is
not to be unexpected. Hospital Products, which solidified the idea that we can have fiduciary
duties based on the peculiar facts of  an engagement, was decided in 1984.140 Bristol and West
Building Society v Mothew, which, by holding that not every duty of  a fiduciary was a fiduciary
duty, bolstered the proposition that fiduciary duties can be scoped, was decided only in
1996.141 Previously, fiduciary duties were thought in some quarters to be monolithic.
Indeed, in its 1992 consultation paper, the Law Commission thought there were two
approaches: ‘status-based’ and ‘contract first’. In the former the contract could not modify
or exclude the duties of  a fiduciary where they were incompatible with the essence of  the
relationship, but in the latter contract terms would more readily relax the duty of  loyalty.142
The view that contractual terms can modify any instance of  the duty of  loyalty is new.
However, the relevant factual scenarios are commonplace, and, while it will take time for
decisions to emerge, emerge they should.
First, consider the error where judges have muddled the type of  reasoning and applied
stage one thinking in stage two or vice versa. The worst outcome is when this faulty
reasoning leads to the wrong decision. The first instance judge in Ross River made this
mistake.143 He applied clause 10.5 in stage one as though it were a ‘yes/no’ sharp-edged
contractual term – how it is applied at stage two – rather than as just one factor of  many,
concluding that it was incompatible with the existence of  a fiduciary duty not to profit or
to avoid conflicts, and thus some payments outside its specification were permitted.144 His
decision had to be reversed. The Court of  Appeal correctly thought that the fiduciary rules
were paramount. The two-stage framework assists in two ways. First, it indicates that clause
10.5’s dominance was only at stage two, not stage one. Second, it makes it clear that fiduciary
norms dominate and are not so easily displaced.
The next class of  errors is where fiduciary norms have not been applied to stage two.
Here, the judges applied contractual doctrines but not the additional fiduciary principles. It
is possible that this is because they have implicitly accepted the idea that fiduciary duties are
implied contractual terms, despite the post-M&S v BNP shift.145 It is also possible that they
have been led astray by the easy fit of  the test for implication in stage two, which has led
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them to think that it is the only test rather than just the first one.146 In the following cases,
the judges’ reasoning fell into error but, more by luck than judgment, they reached the right
decisions.
Global Container Lines Ltd v Bonyad Shipping Co (No 1) concerned a fiduciary shipping joint
venture between the parties, who themselves operated shipping services independently.147
There were two relevant geographic areas. The ‘existing services area’ comprised Global’s
existing Indian Ocean and Red Sea services, and the ‘joint venture area’ comprised services
covering the rest of  the Persian Gulf  but excluding those in the existing services area. The
basic issue was that Global, as a fiduciary, was prohibited from competing with its principal
(the joint venture operation) unless clear consent was obtained. It was held that no
competition was permitted in the joint venture area. This is not surprising – the duty of
loyalty is inconsistent with the right to compete. Conversely, it was held that competition in
the existing services area was impliedly consented to by Bonyad, and thus there the fiduciary
duty was displaced altogether.
One may reach this route by applying our framework. As Rix J found, while express
consent could not be construed from the various minutes in evidence before the court, it
could be found through necessary implication. Bonyad had known about Global’s extensive
existing business and, in essence, giving up 51 per cent of  its business and 75 per cent of
its tramp business would have been ‘unbusinesslike’.148 The minutes Bonyad signed
reflected the reality that the company knew and accepted that this business would continue,
and this constituted consent.149 One may go on to apply the regulating fiduciary rules.
Bonyad knew the facts. The necessity was so strong, even resolving doubts against the
profferer it was possible to infer subjective consent from it. The case went beyond Kelly v
Cooper, which demonstrated only implied consent to act for two principals and
demonstrated consent to compete in certain areas.
The problem is that, while Rix J started along this route, rather than considering the
regulating fiduciary rules, he applied Kelly v Cooper rather mechanically. Competition was
inherent to the business and as such ‘duties . . . of  . . . natural candidates for the status of
fiduciaries . . . have to be tailored to the facts and circumstances’.150 He thought that Kelly v
Cooper was ‘particularly instructive’,151 and the present case was ‘if  anything clearer cut’ than
it. The last point is certainly true, but the factual differences were not considered in full. The
outcome of  Kelly v Cooper was merely that a fiduciary was permitted to act for multiple
principals. Moreover, estate agents act for multiple clients, but they do not positively compete
with them. Self-sacrifice is inherent to a fiduciary relationship, and permitting the estate agent
in Kelly v Cooper to act for multiple principals made considerably fewer inroads into this norm.
If  a case is to go further, one must explore why rather more fully.
Gamatronic (UK) Ltd v Hamilton concerned two directors’ releases of  liability for, inter
alia, breaches of  fiduciary duty.152 This question was the scope of  the release agreements.
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As a stage two issue, sufficiently informed consent is required, which is a subjective
requirement,153 but the principal was not aware of  the relevant breaches of  fiduciary duty
when the releases were drawn up. The judge applied the contractual law of  releases, for
which the leading case is Bank of  Credit and Commerce International SA v Ali.154 He held that,
since the principal was not aware of  the relevant breaches when the release was made, it did
not cover them.155 This indeed is the right rule, but the problem is that it was reached
without considering the fiduciary norms, and authority was applied without considering its
applicability.
The complication is that the law of  releases has become detached from its equitable
roots. It once required the relevant matters to have been in the actual contemplation of  the
parties – that is, it was explicitly a subjective test.156 Nowadays, contract doctrine holds that
the test is objective. As a purely common law contract case (BCCI was not a fiduciary to
Ali), the House of  Lords rejected an inquiry into the parties’ subjective states of  mind: ‘the
court . . . makes an objective judgment based on the materials already identified’.157 The
Law Lords simply did not consider whether matters should be different for fiduciary
liability. Perhaps they would have been sensitive to the question of  fiduciary breach had it
been put to them, and perhaps they would have held that equitable principles should have
continued to apply to equitable duties. The judge in Gamatronic did not look behind Ali, and
thus this issue was not considered. Our framework, specifically the sufficiency rule, makes
the correct enquiry clear by expressly stating the subjectivity requirement.
The same error also occurred in an interim hearing in the same proceedings, where
another first instance judge also thought Ali applied without considering the material
differences between contract law and fiduciary law.158 Again, in John Youngs Insurance Services
Ltd v Aviva Insurance Service UK Ltd159 and in Nathan v Smilovitch160 the judges went straight
to Ali without considering fiduciary matters. John Youngs was correctly decided because the
release was held not to apply even on the less-stringent contract law principles; similarly, in
Nathan v Smilovitch, the relevant term could not be implied even in contract.
It is surely inevitable that at some point a case will come up where the relevant term will
be sufficient on contract law principles, but not on fiduciary law principles. Then, unless the
fiduciary rules are applied, the wrong decision will be made.
5 Conclusion
The two-stage framework results inevitably when constructing doctrine from the
fundamentals of  fiduciary law, namely the purposes of  protection and autonomy and that
even the ‘bad man’ fiduciary needs some level of  certainty. The need to uphold fiduciary
standards and protect the principal demands a multi-factorial approach. The need for a
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fiduciary to be fairly and safely remunerated demands a sharply logical ruleset. Since these
requirements are fundamentally opposed, they can only exist in separate stages.
In coming to this conclusion, there has been one key thread running through the
argument, namely the dominance of  fiduciary principles. Thus, when contractual doctrines
are compatible and useful, they can be and have been received into fiduciary law. However,
one must not forget that contractual authorisation is predominantly fiduciary, and fiduciary
principles take precedence over contractual principles. The duty of  loyalty is not always
moulded by the terms of  the contract and does not always accommodate itself  to them.
This is easy to forget, and in some cases has been forgotten.
The courts appear to be inching towards this framework. That it has not yet been
recognised explicitly is unsurprising in a system of  case-by-case development in an immature
part of  the law, particularly given that the judge’s primary task is to decide the instant case
rather than construct theory. The post-Hospital Products era has been short, and what is going
on appears to be an instance of  what Llewellyn called ‘slow-growing wisdom’.161 As the
common law – including equity – moves on, it creates a consistent and coherent body of  law,
even as it makes mistakes along the way.
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